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Abstract
This study provides evidence of the role played by the financial structure and the lib-
eralization in the crisis for low, middle and high income countries classified by geographic
region. The traditional view of the financial structure-bank vs market based economies- is
challenged by using a the concept of complementarity. We find, as measured by the index
proposed in Saillard and Url (2011) the complementary systems to be less vulnerable to
financial crises and countries with a low level of liberalization in the financial markets and
the banking sectors.
Resume´
Ce papier e´tudie le roˆle joue´ par la structure financie`re et la libe´ralisation pour expliquer
la crise e´conomique. L’e´chantillon de pays est classe´ selon son niveau de de´veloppement
e´conomique et ge´ographiquement. La structure financie`re est repre´sente´e par un nouveau
concept : la comple´mentarite´ entre les banques et le marche´ financier au sein d’un pays.
Ce concept est repre´sente´ par un index de´taille´ dans Saillard et Url (2011). Les syste`mes
comple´mentaires et les moins libe´ralise´s sont moins vulne´rable face a` une crise e´conomique.
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008 caused protracted episodes of falling stock prices and mounting credit
losses. The ensuing economy-wide deleveraging made channeling savings to investment difficult
for both banks and stock markets, a credit crunch loomed. The European sovereign debt crisis of
2011 put a further strain on the European banking system, producing a protracted bear market
characterized by declining values and falling prices. The crisis of 2008 originated in the USA,
a traditionally market-based economy, and spilled to the bank-based economies of continental
Europe. Policy makers now face the challenge of restoring financial and economic stability, and
preventing similar crises in the future.
In this paper we assess how the degree of interconnectedness between banks and stock mar-
kets affects the frequency and the severity of economic crises. The apparent high degree of
interconnectedness between the fates of banks and stock markets in most countries blurs the
distinction between bank and market based economies that has a long tradition in comparative
financial systems and applied macroeconomics. The global financial and economic crisis of 2008
originated in the USA, a traditionally market-based economy, and spilled to the bank-based
economies of continental Europe. The two types of financial systems differ with respect to the
share of financial activity channeled through either the stock market or private banks. Bank-
based financial systems are prevalent in continental Europe with Germany being a prime example
and Switzerland a notable exception, while financial systems in the Anglo-Saxon countries are
heavily market-based.
Existing research on the role of financial architecture has focused on the role of financial
architecture in fostering economic growth. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001), Back and Levine
(2002) have shown the positive effect of financial development of economic growth is only weakly
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effected by the disparities in the relative development of stock markets and banking sectors.
Levine (2002) showed that differences in the overall level of financial development are more
important for growth than financial structure. Existing empirical evidence on the neutrality
of the financial structure for economic growth is not entirely conclusive. For example, Tadesse
(2002) finds that the performance of market based systems are better than that of bank based
systems if the level of development of the financial sector is high, yet bank systems are more
efficient for countries with underdeveloped financial sectors. Deidda and Fattouh (2008) show
that a bank-based system to a mixed system in which there is a high degree of complementarity
between banks and markets can be detrimental to economic growth.
The main hallmarks of financial development are the efficiency and the efficacy of assessing
creditworthiness of prospect borrowers and the stock market capitalization as an indicator of
costs of obtaining external finance. By the virtue of a close bilateral relationship between
the borrower and the lender, banks are considered better in assessing credit risks, while well-
developed stock markets help reduce the cost of equity capital. The bank based versus market
based view underscores the competition between these two alternative sources of external finance,
suggesting that technological development in one sector leads to a shift of demand for external
finance to that sector, at the expense of the other sector.
This competition view hides an important feedback loop between cheap equity and credit.
Lower costs of equity capital helps banks to raise capital needed to meet the higher capital
requirements associated with riskier loans. This allows providing capital to borrowers that
would otherwise not have been funded. The prevailing view that banks and stock markets
compete for funds has been replaced by the idea of co-evolution of both sources of external
finance (Song and Thakor 2010), and the idea of complementarity between banks and stock
markets (Sylla 1998, Song and Thakor 2010). Sylla is among the first to describe a potential
3
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complementarity that may exist between stock markets and banks. For him, this interaction
emerged due to what he called himself the ‘Federalist financial revolution’ in the US. It was a
‘jump starter’ of US economic changes such as the industrial revolution and the transportation
revolution. Song and Thakor (2010) propose a theoretical model showing that systems with a
high degree of complementary are more efficient, stressing the importance of this classification
over the traditional market-bank based view. In an empirical investigation, Saillard and Url
(2011) find that the degree of complementary is positively and significantly correlated with
efficiency in the financial markets.
The recent financial and economic crisis has spurred a debate on the stability of global
financial architecture, and the appropriate economic policies to improve stability in the future.
In this paper we take the complementarity view as a point of departure, and test whether
the degree of complementarity has a discernible statistical relationship on the frequency and
the severity of economic crises. To this end, we developed a newly complementarity metric
(index), suggested in Saillard and Url (2011), and employ this measure together with a number
of explanatory variables reflecting some characteristics the institutional and legal realities in 72
countries of the world.
These characteristics are important for several reasons. First, as have been mentioned above,
the two systems differ not only in the relative importance of bank based finance but also in
their institutional frameworks. The existing literature stresses political determinants such as
the degree of liberalization as important determinant of economic growth in general, and the
performance of an economy in times of crises in particular. Second, recipes for counteracting
crises are likely to be different for developing countries than for developed countries. A survey
of the finance growth nexus by Andersen and Tarp (2003) suggests that policymakers in the
developing countries should not necessarily aim for the traditional financial liberalization policies.
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Misati and Nyamongo (2010) argue that financial liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa has had
a negative impact in the growth of this area. Third, and related, different countries resort to
different counteracting measures and these have to be taken into account, or at least controlled
for, when discussing the effect of financial system on the occurrence of crises ex post.
The paper is structured in the following way. In the next section, we provide details on the
theoretical background and the computation of the complementary index. Section 3 discusses
the data and defines the variables used in the subsequent econometric analysis in Section 4. A
list of variables is provided in an appendix at the end of the paper. The last section discusses
the results and offers concluding remarks. Briefly anticipating our results, we find that, all other
things being equal, the lower the complementarity and the more liberal the financial system,
the more susceptible it is to financial distress measured by a significant loss in an economy’s
real GDP. The conclusions is that while compelementarity between the development of banks
and the stock market plays an important role in fostering economic growth, it also contributes
to economic instability as measured by the variance of growth rates.
2 Computation Method of the Financial Indeces
Currently in the literature, two indices represents two interactions between banks and markets:
one represents the competition whereas the other represents the complementarity. The section
is divided into two parts, we start with the computation of the index representing competition
suggested by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) and the computation of the complementarity
index proposed in Saillard and Url (2011).
The measure for financial market structure suggested by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999)
is a continuous number increasing in the extent of market-based finance of domestic firms.
5
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The index compares the level of financial activity channeled through the stock market to that
facilitated by private banks. The index combines deposits at banks, DB, private credit by banks,
PCB, overhead costs of banks, OCB, the stock market capitalization, SMC, and the stock market
total traded value, SMT. The first two components of the index are the ratio of the stock market
capitalization to deposits at banks, Ait, and the ratio of the stock market total traded value to
private credit by banks, Bit:
Ait =
SMCit
DBit
Bit =
SMTit
PCBit
(1)
Both components are computed for each country i and year t. Furthermore, Demirguc-Kunt
and Levine (1999) use the ratio of bank overhead costs to total assets of banks and multiply it
by the stock market total traded value to GDP ratio to compute the third component, Cit:
Cit =
OCBit
TABit
SMTit
GDPit
(2)
Then all three components, Ait, Bit, and Cit are mean corrected by subtracting the mean
over all countries and years, cf. in the case of the stock market capitalization to deposit at banks
ratio we obtain:
ait = (Ait −A..)
where A.. represent the mean of Ait across countries and years. Finally, the index of financial
market structure, IFMSit, is computed as the average of the three components:
IFMSit =
ait + bit + cit
3
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A higher value of this index clearly indicates a higher degree of market-based finance for
country i. In order to obtain a measure of complementary financial markets we rearrange the
first two components of the index by Demirgurc-Kunt and Levine so that they increase if marked
and bank-based characteristics within a country are balanced. Specifically, we compute products
rather than ratios between marked- and bank-based variables and normalize all variables with
respect to GDP to make numbers comparable across countries:
A∗it =
DBit
GDPit
SMCit
GDPit
B∗it =
PCBit
GDPit
SMTit
GDPit
(3)
The modified ratios achieve a maximum value if market- and bank based finance are of
equal size, reflecting the idea of complementary rather than competitive financial markets. This
hump−shape pattern is illustrated in Figure ICindex for stylized economies with either loan or
equity finance. If the country is fully market-based, firms will be completely financed by equity
and the country will show up on the origin of the horizontal axis. Fully bank-based economies,
on the other hand, will show up at the right hand corner. The index of complementarity will
consequently have low values at both extrema points and will have its maximum if market- and
bank-based features are balanced. The third indicator, Cit, does not have a similar reinterpre-
tation; we therefore take Cit as in Demirguc-Kunt and Levine. Again we subtract means across
countries and years from the modified components, making the index of complementary finance,
ICit, increasing in the size of financial markets within country i relative to the sample average:
ICit =
a∗it + b
∗
it + cit
3
The index of complementarity is computed in Saillard and Url (2011a) and tested in Saillard
and Url (2011b) considering a panel of 19 OECD countries. In this last paper, authors validates
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the Song and Thakor complementarity theory by finding that complementarity represented by
the index can explain the degree of the efficiency in the financial systems.
The preceding framework is provided as a starting point to represent the complementarity
in an empirical study. The next section is devoted to describe the data and empirical models.
3 Data
Computation of the financial crisis As emphasized by Pitlik (2011), the definition concerning
the measure of what constitute a crisis is not uniform in the literature. Specially, this paper
studies two potential determinants of a financial crisis: the financial structure and the financial
liberalization. In line with Pitlik (2011) and Duval and Elmesov (2006), I use the output gap
crisis definition. Specifically, if a negative output gap of at least 4% can be observed for at least
two consecutive years over a five year period, we call this an output gap crisis. The output gap
is computed from the trend and cycle extracted using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
The method of the HP filter is illustrated by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). The program of
minimization can be written as follow:
min
τt
τ∑
τ=1
((yit − τt)
2 + λ((τt+1 − τt)− (τt − τt−1))
2)
By using this program, the filter removes a smooth trend τt from yit, the GDP for the panel
considered. The cycle component or residual or deviation from the trend is identified by yit− τt.
As underlined, by Ravn and Uhlig λ, the smoothing parameter penalizes the acceleration of the
trend relative to the cycle component. Both authors demonstrated that λ=6.25 is adequate for
yearly data. I follow it to obtain the output gap crisis dependent variable definition defined
earlier.
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Complementarity Index. To represent the financial structure, I will use the index computed
in Saillard-Url (2011). This index follows the recent theory of Song and Thakor (Song and
Thakor 2010). Both authors stress that it would be more relevant to use the complementarity-
complementer vs non complementer systems- to study the concept of finance structure. In the
Figure 1, a classification of the countries, by groups following the level of competition (bank vs
market based) and complementarity is proposed. As indicated in this figure, the most advanced
countries are those with a high value of the complementarity and competition index with South
Africa as notable exception.
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Figure 1: The Complementarity and the Competition (Levine) indexes
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Financial Reform Index. The database (Abiad, Detragiache, Tressel 2008)) considers seven
dimensions of financial reform: credit controls reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry
barriers, state ownership, policies on securities markets, banking regulation and restrictions on
the financial account. For each of this seven variables, the authors compute a score representing
liberalization. The main advantage of this database is that it allows to study the broad concept
of liberalization without restricting into a binary score. Moreover, considering the period 1973-
2005 allows to study crises in 1990s. Another advantage of this database is that it allows to
consider reforms decided for the financial markets and banks. It is useful for testing the Song
and Thakor proposal on regulation, i.e take in consideration , politically, both market and banks
in the decisions.
I choose the variable openness of the economy as crisis determinants, this choice being guided
by the literature. The literature is divided concerning the impact of this variable. Chang et
all (2005) describe the debate existing about the importance of international trade openness on
economic growth. Specifically, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) address the principal question why
openness can be detrimental.
The variable used in this currently paper is the degree of openness in an economy. (see
Appendix for further details).
The size of government is represented in the models by government consumption.
11
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Crisis 0.391 0.488 0 1 335
Complementarity 0.063 1.385 -0.690 14.870 1109
Competition 0.052 1.227 -1.084 13.548 1109
Reform 10.888 6.389 0 21 1769
Government Consumption 8.922 3.979 0.288 38.365 3560
Inflation 27.496 266.0 -21.675 11749 3905
Openness -0.001 1.522 -1.844 2.478 5885
4 Estimation results
The following regression analysis proceeds in two steps. We first test whether the scale and scope
of financial liberalization reflected in the financial reform index has an impact on the degree of
complementarity and competition between the banking sector and the stock market. The main
objective of this preliminary analysis is to uncover the interplay between financial structure and
financial liberalization that has been suggested in the literature (Andersen 2003 and Ling Sun
Jiang 2009). The degrees of complementarity and competition are given by the complementarity
index detailed above and the Levine index (Levine 2004), respectively. As we noted above, the
complementarity index summarizes the degree of interconnectedness of the banking sector and
the stock market. Higher values of the complementarity index correspond to higher degrees
of complementarity. The IMF financial reform index summarizes institutions, policy measures
and regulations, such that the higher the index value the more liberal the financial system of
a country is. The estimates are obtained using the panel OLS, as the dependent variables can
12
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assume a continuum of values. These estimates are summarized in Table 3.
Table 2: Correlation Matrix
Complementarity 1
Competition 0.466*** 1
Reform 0.377*** 0.273*** 1
Inflation -0.0492 -0.0381 -0.0808*** 1
Government Consumption 0.0557* -0.0454 0.0193 -0.000997 1
Openness 0.334*** 0.143*** 0.697*** -0.0922*** 0.0959*** 1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The degree of financial liberalization has a positive and statistically significant effect on both
the degree of complementarity and the degree of competition. Both effects have roughly similar
magnitudes but are, quantitatively small. The estimates convey that one point increase on the
Financial Reform scale would increase the complementarity index by 0.06, or roughly 4 percent
of a standard deviation of the complementarity index (see summary statistics in Table 1). Such
an increase in the reform indicator would correspond, for example, to the difference between
Switzerland (index value of 20) and Germany (index value of 19) in 2005. The coefficient of
determination, R2, attests modest explanatory power in these very parsimonious specifications.
The Hausman specification test rejects fixed effects in favor of random effects.
Preliminary results collected in Table 3 together with significantly positive correlation coeffi-
cients between the measures of complementarity and financial liberalization reported in Table 2
indicate the need to model the interaction between complementarity and financial liberalization
in a regression 1. We do so with (linear) interaction terms in the second step of our estimation
procedure.
1The Breusch-Pagan test indicates a large chi-square for both models which indicate that heteroscedasticity
was present after running the Ordinary Least Squares models.
13
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.38
Table 3: Panel OLS Random Effects
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Complementarity Competition
Reform 0.0590*** 0.0849***
(0) (0)
Constant -0.957*** -1.344***
(3.76e-07) (0)
Observations 936 936
Number of countries 74 74
R-squared overall model 0.142 0.0745
pval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In a second step we model the incidence of a major economic crisis, defined as a 4 percent
decline in the real per capita GDP sustained over five years, using the degree of complementarity,
competition and liberalization. The annual binary variables are coded such that it takes the
value of one if an economic crisis according to the above definition occurs in that year. To control
for long term macroeconomic factors that may influence the likelihood of a major economic crisis,
we include several additional explanatory variables such as the size of the country, relative size
of the public sector, the degree of economic openness and broad regional indicator variables.
The binary nature of the dependent variable largely determines the choice of suitable regres-
sion techniques. We opt for a panel logit regression with random effects, and reestimating the
regression in the few cases in which the presence of fixed effects cannot be ruled out on the basis
of a Hausman specification test. The maximum likelihood estimates of panel logit regressions
are presented in Table 4. The reported (slope) coefficients give the rate of change in the ‘log
odds’ of the crisis variable as a result of a change in the explanatory variable.
A negative coefficient in a logit regression indicates that an increase in the explanatory
variable decreases the likelihood of a major economic crisis, and we observe negative coefficients
14
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on both complementarity and competition measures in all six specifications. Their effects remain
negative even after factoring in the coefficients on the interaction terms. Indeed, evaluated at
mean of Reform (see, Table 1), the coefficient on Complementarity in the first specifications
equals -1.498.
The main effect of liberalization is positive, meaning that, all other things being equal, more
liberal economies are more susceptible to severe economic to downturns. Again, the positive
sign remains after accounting for the interaction term. In all specifications featuring the com-
plementarity index this effect is highly statistically significant, whereas Levine’s competition
measure fairs slightly worse in terms of statistical significance. The χ2 test supports random
effects hypothesis, while McFadden’s R2 indicates a satisfactory fit.2
Turning to the other explanatory variables, we find that, all other things being equal, large
and open economies are more susceptible to financial and economic crises on average. This
result is not surprising given that demand slackening during an economic downturn typically
propagates via foreign trade, dragging open economies in its wake. The size effect is attributed to
the fact that economic crisis in large countries tend to be global crises rather than idiosyncratic
developments in the particular country in question. Put differently, ones large countries are
affected, one can be sure to have a severe and largely international crisis developing.
The level of government consumption, as an indicator of the size of the public sector relative
to the rest of an economy does not have any explanatory power for the likelihood of a major
crisis. This is surprising, given that the size of automatic stabilizers and the scope of anticrisis
(especially fiscal) measures that are aimed at mitigating the adverse effects of the crisis tend to
increase the size of the public sector relative to the rest of the economy. This effect, however, is
2The interpretation on McFadden’s pseudo coefficient of determination, as well as many other such measure
must taken with care in the context of generalized linear models (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989) and their panel
derivatives. In particular, the measure is not bounded to the unit interval.
15
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not statistically significant.
In sum, the estimates in Table 4 that financial systems with a highly liberalized financial
system with a low degree of complementarity between bank and stock market are more vulnerable
to a crisis occurrence. This statement is true on average for all countries in the sample. Countries
in some regions are, however, more vulnerable to economic crises, the Sub Saharan Africa and
Transition countries being the most susceptible, while advanced and emerging Asian economies
being least prone to financial and economic crises. The comparison group is that of Middle East
and North African countries.
5 Conclusions
This paper shows that financial structure and financial liberalization, all other thing being
equal, increase the likelihood of a major economic crisis. The key characteristic of the financial
structure is the degree of complementarity between banking and stock-market finance. The
degree of complementarity generalizes the notion of bank-based and market-based economies
prevalent in earlier literature on finance-growth nexus, and on the macroeconomic effect of
financial architecture in general. Regression estimates on the likelihood odds of a major economic
crisis shows that, on average, the higher the complementarity, the lower is the probability of a
crisis. Further, it is shown that the degree of financial liberalization also increases the likelihood
of a crisis.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the results presented in the foregoing sections.
We have indicated that liberalization may increase the likelihood of economic crises. The open
question is whether curtailing liberalization is an option that could make the financial system
more stable. Ling Sun Jiang (2009) have argued that measures to promote liberalization have
16
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to be tailored to the economic realities, the degree of financial development and the financial
structure of an economy.
This focus on the role of financial structure, and the interplay between regulation and the
financial structure has been stressed by Song and Thakor (2010), who warn about the simplistic
competition view of the financial structure. Their theoretical findings call for an alternative
regulation at the policy level and a different definition of the financial structure. Specifically,
Song and Thakor suggest considering simultaneously regulation in financial markets and the
banking industry. The financial reform index used in this paper allows pursuing this suggestion
because it offers a multi-faceted and an inclusive measure of the state the financial markets and
the banking sectors, and the reforms in them. Thus in this paper we challenge the traditional
definition of bank versus market based economies by using modeling 1) complementarity and
2) the interaction between the financial structure and the level of financial liberalization as the
main institutional determinant.
17
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Table 4: Panel logit on Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Complementarity -3.632*** -4.087*** -3.767***
(0.985) (1.110) (1.008)
Complementarity×Reform 0.196*** 0.216*** 0.199***
(0.0502) (0.0565) (0.0512)
Competition -0.516 -0.269 -0.130
(0.477) (0.476) (0.438)
Competition×Reform 0.0519* 0.0350 0.0233
(0.0290) (0.0285) (0.0259)
Reform 0.251*** 0.361*** 0.315*** 0.155*** 0.250*** 0.204***
(0.0489) (0.0574) (0.0575) (0.0409) (0.0484) (0.0489)
Government Consumption -0.0664 -0.0662 -0.0238 -0.0337
(0.0575) (0.0486) (0.0561) (0.0470)
Openness -0.442*** -0.248** -0.480*** -0.274**
(0.118) (0.114) (0.118) (0.114)
Inflation 0.00132** 0.00135** 0.00142** 0.00142**
(0.000585) (0.000583) (0.000600) (0.000593)
Advanced -1.514** -1.458**
(0.635) (0.647)
Emerging Asia 0.324 -0.0192
(0.652) (0.638)
Latin America -0.776 -0.639
(0.616) (0.620)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.797 0.761
(0.727) (0.728)
Transition 1.912*** 1.953***
(0.737) (0.737)
Constant -4.156*** -4.991*** -4.139*** -2.326*** -3.192*** -2.276**
(0.857) (1.022) (1.054) (0.684) (0.887) (0.909)
Observations 934 886 886 934 886 886
Number of countries 73 70 70 73 70 70
χ
2 Statistic 30.56 46.14 64.84 26.27 40.98 58.03
Panel-level Std. Dev. 1.666 1.546 1.045 1.764 1.573 1.050
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Panel logit on Crisis with index components
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A(comp) -11.73*** -7.333*** -6.111**
(2.747) (2.769) (2.526)
B(comp) 4.308 -1.593 -2.406
(4.066) (4.884) (4.640)
C(comp) 130.8 89.50 100.7
(84.64) (91.56) (85.08)
A(comp)×Reform 0.618*** 0.401*** 0.326**
(0.142) (0.143) (0.130)
B(comp)×Reform -0.236 0.0565 0.114
(0.210) (0.249) (0.237)
C(comp)×Reform -5.990 -4.087 -4.814
(4.301) (4.636) (4.315)
A -1.140* -0.534 -0.328
(0.692) (0.694) (0.640)
B 2.531* 3.477** 3.563***
(1.409) (1.454) (1.378)
C -172.3* -342.8*** -320.5***
(96.68) (111.5) (103.0)
A×Reform 0.0759 0.0522 0.0252
(0.0471) (0.0477) (0.0437)
B×Reform -0.105 -0.161** -0.163**
(0.0791) (0.0810) (0.0758)
C×Reform 8.842* 17.11*** 16.11***
(4.831) (5.541) (5.143)
Reform 0.107*** 0.197*** 0.167*** 0.0862** 0.201*** 0.171***
(0.0370) (0.0456) (0.0456) (0.0406) (0.0491) (0.0490)
Government Consumption -0.0837 -0.0799 -0.0269 -0.0375
(0.0605) (0.0508) (0.0552) (0.0457)
Inflation 0.00119** 0.00120** 0.00193*** 0.00193***
(0.000596) (0.000590) (0.000696) (0.000713)
Openness -0.406*** -0.218* -0.472*** -0.258**
(0.122) (0.117) (0.118) (0.114)
Advanced -1.387** -1.223*
(0.653) (0.626)
Emerging Asia 0.385 0.252
(0.672) (0.619)
Latin America -0.719 -0.346
(0.630) (0.600)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.926 1.141
(0.746) (0.724)
Transition 2.078*** 2.140***
(0.764) (0.714)
Constant -1.495** -1.873** -1.398 -1.467** -2.655*** -2.134**
(0.621) (0.294) (0.887) (0.318) (0.361) (0.885)
Observations 934 886 886 934 886 886
Number of countries 73 70 70 73 70 70
χ2 Statistic 39.68 46.85 64.17 32.33 48.42 68.50
Panel-level Std. Dev. 1.765 1.625 1.071 1.717 1.523 0.985
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A Description and sources of data
Liberalization, Source: Abiad, Detragiache, Tressel (2008)
Financial Reform Index see Abiad, Detragiache, Tressel (2008) for details.
Security Markets Different policies governments use to either restrict or encourage develop-
ment of securities market.
International capital flows Restrictions on international financial transactions.
Entry barriers/pro-competition measures Government restrictions of new domestic banks
into the financial system.
Interest rate controls All the government actions operated to control both lending and de-
posit rates.
Banking Supervision Degree of government intervention in the banking sector.
Privatization Share of banking sector assets controlled by state-owned banks.
Directed credit/reserve requirements Requirement of bank lending to certain priority sec-
tors and reserve requirements.
Macroeconomic variables
Complementarity Index See Section 2 for the methodology. Represents the complementarity
view. Index already used in Saillard, Url 2011b
Competition Index Described above. Represents the banks vs market view: Index already
computed and used Saillard and Url (2011b)
Gvt Consumption Government Consumption Share of PPP Converted GDP Per Capita at
2005 constant prices Source: Penn World Table
Openness Openness at Current Price, Source: Penn World Table
Inflation Measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the
cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed
or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. World Bank Indicators
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Table 6: Country Codes
Country Code Country Code Country Code
Argentina ARG Greece GRC Pakistan PAK
Australia AUL Guatemala GUA Paraguay PAR
Austria AUS Hungary HUN Peru PER
Bangladesh BNG India IND Philippines PHI
Belgium BEL Indonesia INS Poland POL
Bolivia BOL Ireland IRE Portugal POR
Brazil BRA Israel ISR Romania ROM
Bulgaria BUL Italy ITA Russia RUS
Canada CAN Jamaica JAM Singapore SIN
Chile CHL Japan JPN South Africa SAF
China CHN Jordan JOR Spain SPN
Colombia COL Kazakhstan KZK Sri Lanka SRI
Costa Rica COS Kenya KEN Sweden SWD
Ivory Coast CDI Korea KOR Switzerland SWZ
Czech Republic CZR Kyrgyzstan KYR Tanzania TAZ
Denmark DEN Latvia LAT Thailand THI
Ecuador ECU Lithuania LIT Tunisia TUN
Egypt EGY Malaysia MAL Turkey TUR
El Salvador SAL Mexico MEX Uganda UGA
Estonia EST Morocco MOR United Kingdom UKG
Finland FIN Nepal NEP United States USA
France FRN Netherlands NTH Uruguay URU
Georgia GRG New Zealand NEW Venezuela VEN
Germany GMY Nigeria NIG Vietnam RVN
Ghana GHA Norway NOR
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